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' 
The Rational and the Reasonable * 
by 
Chaim Perelman 
The existence of two adjectives, "rational" arid "reasonable", both derived 
from the same noun, and d�signating a conformity with reason, would pose no 
problem if the two terms were interchangeable. But, most often, it is not so. We 
understand t!be expression rational deduction as conformity to the rules of logic, 
but we cannot speak of a reasonable deduction. On. the contrary, we can speak 
of a reasonable compromise and not of a ration.al compromise. At times the two 
terms are applicable but in. a different sense: a rational decision can be unreason· 
able and vice versa. In certain cases the l'.8
.
tional. and the reasonable are in. precise 
opposition. Pannenides' theses on being, by seeking to eliminate all incoherence 
from opinions which the common sense entertains in relation to this subject, ends 
in conclusions which � · be presented as. rational but . which certainly are not 
reasonable. If Wittgenstein is right in affirming (On Certai·nty, p. 261) that there are 
things that a reasonable man cannot doubt (e.g., that for a time the earth existed), 
that a reasonable doubt cannot be arbitrary be.cause it must have a foundation 
(Ibid., p. 328) then Descarte's methodical and above all hyperbolic doubt, given 
as rational, is . certainly unreasonable because it WQUld demand an abstention, a 
refusal to accept, every time we are not compelled by the self-evidence of a prop· 
osition. Professor Raleigh rebels against the attitude of William Godwin -the 
anarchist disciple of Jeremy Bentham - who tries to control all the most human , sentiments by the mechanism of the intellect and who seriously maintains that he 
is .wrong. to love his father more than other men, unless he is able to prove that 
his father is better than these other men.1 
. To take into account the difference ·which separates the rational. from the 
reasonable we have to admit that if the two conform to reason, · it is that the 
idea of reason is shown in at least two diametrically opposite ways. The rational 
corresponds to mathematical reason, for some a reflection of divine reason, which 
grasps n�cessary relations, which knows a priori ceJ;tain self-evident and immutable 
truths, which is at the same time individual and universal; because by being re­
vealed within a single mind, it imposes its themes on all beings of reason, because 
it owes nothing to experience or to dialogue, and depends neither on �ducation 
nor on the �ulture of a milieu or an epoch. . 
The concept of the rational, which ls associated with self-evident .truths and 
compelling reasoning, is .valid only In a theoretical domain. When it is a question 
of behavior� we quall.fy as rational, behavior in conformity to principles, to the 
spirit of the system, behavior which chooses ends through knowledge of cause, 
makes use of the most efficacious means, and makes action conform to the results 
of on�·s renections and designs, not allowing oneself to be held or led astray by 
the emotions or passions. According to Bertrand Russell, the rational man would 
only be an inhuman monster. We wowd have little chance of meeting him. in the 
flesh, but everyoµe .knows a more or less perfect approximation of him, as in this 
quote by Brand .Blanshard: 
"He tries to incarnate pure intelligence. The wheels of his intellect 
revolve in a vacuum, and if at a furious pace, so much the better. He 
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acts always from calculation, never from impulse, affection or even 
hatred. He sees a long way ahead, cunningly adjusts his means to his 
ends, is all things to all men while caring little for any, never forgets 
himself, and is never carried away by enthusiasm or sentimentality. 
While making no mistakes of his own, at least none that mere inteUi­
gence could avoid, he sees through everyone else, notes their stupid­
ities and uses them with superlative craft for his own purpose. He is 
icily competent, intimidatingly efficient, free from all romantic and 
humanitarian nonsense, knows what he wants, and moves toward it by 
the straightest line."2 
This vision of the "rational" man separates reason from the other human 
f acuities and shows a unilateral being functioning as a mechanism, deprived of 
humanity and insensible to the reactions· of the milieu: he is the opposite of.the 
reasonable man. The latter is a man who in his· judgments and conduct is influenced 
by common sense. 
He is guided by the search, in all domains, for what is acceptable in his 
milieu and even beyond it, for what should be accepted by all. Putting himself in 
the place of others he does not consider himself an exception but seeks to con· 
form to principles of action which are acceptable to everyone. He considers as 
unreasonable a rule of action which cannot be universalized. Starting thus, from 
a communal conception of reason, we end in a Kantian categorical Imperative 
which makes the universal the criterion of morality. 
If we take the English moralist Henry Sidgwick, the man and his ideas, as 
a model of the reasonable man, 3 we see impartiality, which makes no exception 
for anyone, but which considers everyone, in principle, as interchangeable, the 
criterion, par excellence, of practical reason: 
"We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B unless 
we can find in the natures or circumstances of the two some differ­
ences which we can regard as a reasonable ground for differences in 
their duties. If therefore I judge any action to be right for myself, 
I implicitly judge it to be right for any other person whose nature 
and circumstances do not differ from my own in some important 
respects. "4 
In an analogous manner: 
" ... it cannot be right for A to treat B in a manner in which it would 
be wrong for B to treat A, merely on the ground that they are two 
different individuals, and without there �ing any difference between 
the natures or circumstances of the two which can be stated as a 
reasonable 2found for difference of treatment. ,,5 
These two negative maxims correspond to what is valuable in the golden 
rule which says, "Do to your neighbor as you would want your neighbor to do 
to you." But Sidgwick denies that the golden rule gives a sufficient criterion of 
morality. 
A principle of action which others would coll5ider acceptable and even as 
reasonable cannot arbitrarily favor certain people or certain situations: What is 
reasonable must be able to be a precedent which can inspire everyone in analogous 
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circumstances, and from this comes the value of the generalization or the univer­
salization which is characteristic of the �asonable. 
But a rule of action defined as reasonable or even as self -evident at one 
moment or in a given situation can seem arbitrary and even ridiculous at another 
moment and in a different situation. The Supreme Court of Belgium in a judgment 
of J.1 November 1889 justified the inadmissibility of women to the bar in spite 
of the absence of any law to this effect, affirming that "if the legislature had not 
excluded women from the bar by a formal disposition it was because it was too 
self-evident an axiom to state, that the service of justice was reserved to men."6 
This affirmation which seemed self ·evident, thus certainly reasonable, a century 
ago, would be inadmissible, even ridiculous today. The reasonable of one age is 
not the reasonable of another, it can vary like common sense. 
In this conflict between the reasonable and the rational, which should carry 
the day? If the reasonable is tied to common opinion, to common sense, every 
scientific and philosophic effort which would deviate, in the name of certain 
principles, for internal coherence, for the spirit of the system or for whatever 
theory, would be condemned in advance, every paradoxical novelty, every idea 
departing from the ordinary, but conforming to rational principles, would have 
to be excluded. We would thus, condemn, at the same time, the whole spirit of 
novelty, air progress of thought; which is inadmissible. The reasonable of today 
is not the reasonable of yesterday, but is more often an effort toward more coher­
ence, toward more clarity, toward a more systemati7.ed view of things which is 
at the base of change. 
On the other hand, it is true that in a philosophic discussion when two sys­
tems are opposed to each other, it is only by going back to copimon opinions, to 
common reality, that we find criteria that are independent of each of the compet-, 
ing systems. · 
It is the dialectic of the rational and the reasonable, the confrontation of 
logical coherence with the unreasonable character of conclusions, which is at the 
base of the progress of thought. 
. How does this confrontation, this dialectic, show itself in law'? It would be 
interesting to examine this. 
For centuries, the rational has been identified with natural law. Domat, 
the best known French legal writer of the 18th century, states in his "Traite des 
Lois," that the rules of natural law are those that God himself has established and 
teaches to men by "the light of reason." These laws present immutable justice, the 
same everywhere and always; whether written or unwritten, no human authority 
can abolish or change them (Preliminary book, vol. I, sect. ill). 
Domat follows here the well-known ideas expressed by Cicero in his Republic 
(Book ill, chapter 32): 
"There's a true law, right reason that conforms to nature, present in 
all of us, immutable, eternal; this law directs men to the good by its 
commands, and detours them from evil by its prohibitions; should it 
order or prohibit, it does not address itself in vain to the virtuous, 
but has no influence on the wicked. It is impermissible to oppose it 
by other laws, nor to derogate its precepts; it is impossible to 
abrogate this law; neither the Senate nor the people can exonerate us 
from it. It cannot be different in Rome or in Athens, and it will not 
be in the future different from what it is today; but one and the same 
law, etemal and immutable, will impose itself upon all peoples forever. 
31 
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One Master being the leader, He is the author of this law, who has 
promulgated and sanctions it. Those who do not obey it, negate human 
natuN and must anticipate the severest punishments." 
This idea of human reason, as obeying God's reason, has been reduced, In 
the continental legal methodology, to the idea of the rationality of the legislator, 
that is presupposed for the interpretation of legal texts. The legislator is supposed 
to know the language he is using, the system in which the new laws are inserted, 
preserves the coherence of the system, and adapts the means to the ends he is pur­
suing. Those presuppositions make it poaible to apply the arguments a part, a 
fortiori and a contrario. But unlike natural law, we do not presuppose today that 
the legal rules are universal and immutable. 
The ideas of the reasonable and the unreasonable ln law play a completely 
different role: they provide a framework In which any legal authority has to rune-· 
tlon. What is unreasonable ls always unacceptable In law: the existence of this 
framework makes it impossib}e to reduce the legal system to a formal and positiv­
istic concept. 
Every time any legal institution gives to an authority a certain power, even a 
discretionary power, it is presupposed that this power will not be exercised in an 
unreasonable manner. 
There are different ways to denominate this unreasonable exercise of power: 
you may call it abuse of law, excess or misapplication of power, bad faith, iniquity, 
a ridiculous or arbitrary application of legal regulations, an act contrary to the 
general principles of .law common to all civilized nations. Due process of law can­
not permit the exercise of power in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. We 
find application of this principle in private and public law, ln civil and commercial 
matters, in the judicial, or even legislative exercise of power. 
For example, article 1864 of the Code Napoleon, concerning private partner­
ships, says that, if associates decide that one of them has the discretionary power 
to allocate parts, his decision �Y be attacked lf lt ls clearly inequitable. This is 
the appllcatfon of a more general principle concerning possible conventions that 
state that all decisions have to be reasonable. Domat says In his Traite (Book I, 
t. I, sect. Ill bar 11) that nothing is acceptable in law that is beyond the limits of 
reason and equity. This principle holds in continental law for the decisions of the 
board of any commercial society, and even for the decisions of the majority of 
shareholders takt1n in a General Meeting. 
Whenever some discretionary power ls given to the Governmental Executive, 
its decisions: would be considered as abuse ot discretion if they are cle&\'lY unreason· 
able, that is clearly contrary to the overall objective. 
The unreasonable is the limit that any legal exercise of power cannot trans· 
gress: the power that ls given implies a possible choice between different eventuali­
ties, but only up to a certain limit; In cases of trespass, the unreHonable use of legal 
authority will be censured. 
The rational in law correspondS to adherence to an immutable divine· stan­
dard, or to the spirit of the system, to logic and coherence, to conformity with 
precedents, to purposefulness; whereas the reasonable, on the other hand, charac­
terizes the decision itself, the fact that it is acceptable or not by public opinion, 
that its consequences are socially useful or harmful, that it is felt to be equitable 
or biased. · 
When the rational and the reasonable mutually support each other-, when 
reasoning according to principles ends in a satisfying decision, there is no problem. 
82 
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But when the fidelity to the spirit of a system leads to an unacceptable, biased or 
socially inadmissible conclusion, in a word, to an unreasonable conclusion, this 
leads to the indispensability of a reconsideration of the system. Most often doctrine 
and jurisprudence find a solution to the conflict by modifying the system on one 
point or another. Blit it happens that the reas,onable decision, which at first is 
imposed as the sole equitable one, might be justified only by recourse to a fiction, 
which might be a presentation of facts contrary to the reality or an apparent 
motivation. 
There are situations which give room frequently to confiicts between the 
Supreme Co�rt and the intermediate Courts of Appeal, the- latter being more con­
cerned with the reasonable solution of the litigation, taking into account the social 
consequences of the solution to be adopted, the former being more sensitive to the 
spirit of the system and to the logical coherence of the decision. 
A well-known example of such a conflict in Belgian law is the Rossi affair 
where a Belgian woman, abandoned by her Italian husband, had! asked for a divorce, 
allowed by Belgian law, but unacceptable in Italian law which did not permit 
divorce. Two Appeal Courts which had to examine the case agreed to the divorce. 
Twice the Supreme Court opposed it, arguing from the fact that divorce implied 
that one divorced the husband at the same time as the wife and since Italian law 
did not pennit divorce this solution Wl;lS legally impossible. Divorce could be grant­
ed, according to the Supreme Court, only if the two legislations, the woman's as 
well as the man's, permitted it. This is the theory of the cumulative effect of 
legislations. 
The Belgian Parliament, finding the jurisprudence of the Supreme C9urt 
unreasonable, condemning 300 Belgian women abandoned by their Italian husbands 
to no possibility of making a normal life for the·mselves, introduced legislation ac­
cording to which Belgian law would apply if one member of the marriage was 
Belgian, as well as in case of marriage among foreigners, if the national law of the 
plaintiff did not prohibit divorce, 
In this case the legislator imposed its will on the Supreme Court, forcing a 
reasonable solution to prevail over the spirit of the system. But in other cases it is 
the judge himself who imposes a reasonable solution even at the price ·of a juridical 
fiction. To cite an example, in the case of unusual damage from a neighbor, the 
proprietor, who caused his neighbor damage, although he had committed no fault, 
was nevertheless required to repair the damage caused, on the basis on Article 1382 
of the Civil Code, which explicitly refers to the repair of damages caused by tort. 
But the fact that recourse was had to a legal fiction caused difficulties which 
showed up periodically in later law suits. The law suits ceased when a new judicial 
theory allowed reconciliation of the rational and the reasonable, equity with the 
spirit of the system. Article 544 defines the right of property and the consequences 
to be drawn from it: that· each property owner has equal right to the protection 
of the law, that the courts are obliged to guarantee a balance among property 
owners, compensating those property owners who have suffered unusual damage 
as a result of legally exercised property rights of his neighbor. If a property owner 
constructs a skyscraper next to a small house, preventing a normal flow from the 
chimney of the neighboring house, he would be obligated, at his expense, to raise 
the chimney so as to restore its normal operation. The search for a reasonable 
solution is the cause of progress in law by obligating modification or reinterpreta­
tion of existing regulations. 
The idea of the reasonable intervenes in law in the absence of a theory which 
would furnish more precise criteria for the b8$is of a decision. What is the com-
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pensation which the victim has a right to from another's faulty action? 'Y.'hat are 
the consequences that can be reasonably imputed to this action? All theories elabor­
ated in this regard are shown to be unsatisfactory and veey often, with complex 
situations, judges refer to what is reasonable, to justify their decisions without 
being able to formulate a precise rule which would be applicable in au cases of 
this kind. 
'lbus, the idea of the reasonable in law corresponds to an equitable solution, 
in the absence of all precise rules of adjudication. But it can be that recourse to 
the reasonable only gives a provisional solution, waiting for the elaboration of 
new legal construction which would be· more satisfying. The reasonable guideS this 
endeavor toward systematization, toward the rational systematic solution. 
•Presented on November 1, 1977 at the colloquium on Rationality Today in 
Ottawa. Published in the Proceedings of Rationality Today, February., 1978 . 
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